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Abstract
Informal social hierarchies within small human groups are argued to be based on prestige, dominance, or a combination of 
the two (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Prestige-based hierarchies entail the ordering of individuals by the admiration and 
respect they receive from others due to their competence within valued domains. This type of hierarchy provides benefits 
for subordinates such as social learning opportunities and both private and public goods. In contrast, dominance-based 
hierarchies entail the ordering of individuals by their capacity to win fights, and coerce or intimidate others. This type of 
hierarchy produces costs in subordinates due to its aggressive and intimidating nature. Given the benefits and costs associ-
ated with these types of social hierarchies for subordinates, we hypothesised that prestige and dominance cues are better 
recalled and transmitted than social rank cues that do not elicit high prestige or dominance associations (i.e. medium social 
rank cues). Assuming that for the majority of the population who are not already at the top of the social hierarchy it is more 
important to avoid the costs of dominance-based hierarchies than to obtain the benefits of prestige-based hierarchies, we 
further hypothesised that dominance cues are better transmitted than prestige cues. We conducted a recall-based transmis-
sion chain experiment with 30 chains of four generations each (N = 120). Participants read and recalled descriptions of 
prestigious, dominant, and medium social rank footballers, and their recall was passed to the next participant within their 
chain. As predicted, we found that both prestige cues and dominance cues were better transmitted than medium social rank 
cues. However, we did not find support for our prediction of the better transmission of dominance cues than prestige cues. 
We discuss whether the results might be explained by a specific social-rank content transmission bias or by a more general 
emotional content transmission bias.
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Introduction
Social hierarchies are a universal phenomenon in our spe-
cies (Von Rueden 2014), emerging rapidly and spontane-
ously during social interactions (Anderson & Kilduff 2009; 
Cheng et al. 2013; Smith & Foti 1998). Being at the top of 
the hierarchy in a human social group is associated with 
positive fitness outcomes such as greater access to resources, 
mating opportunities, and greater number of surviving off-
spring (Betzig 1988; Chagnon 1988; Hill 1984; Mealey 
1985; Savin-Williams 1979; Snyder et al. 2008; Von Rueden 
2014; von Rueden et al. 2010; von Rueden & Jaeggi, 2016). 
People at the top usually act as leaders of groups, which 
helps to solve group problems such as collective decision-
making and within-group coordination (Anderson & Willer 
2014). Consequently, social hierarchy is not only beneficial 
for the individuals at the top but also, potentially, for groups 
and their members. Nevertheless, hierarchies also produce 
costs for groups and their members as they can lead to abuse 
of lower social rank individuals, which diminishes group 
morale and lowers group performance (Anderson & Willer 
2014).
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The dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy (Cheng 
2019; Cheng & Tracy 2014; Cheng et al. 2013; Henrich 
& Gil-White 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi 2019b; Maner & 
Case, 2016; Redhead et al. 2018a) might help to explain 
this contrast between the benefits and costs of social hier-
archy. According to this model, informal social hierarchies 
within small human groups can be based on prestige, dom-
inance, or a combination of the two. Prestige-based hier-
archies entail the ordering of members of a social group 
by their prestige (sometimes referred to as “status”), which 
is defined as the respect, esteem, and admiration that they 
receive by other members of the group (Anderson et al. 
2015). Prestige is voluntarily given by others (Blader & 
Chen 2014; de Waal-Andrews et al. 2015), usually due 
to being competent in domains that are appreciated by 
a group (Henrich & Gil-White 2001). For example, fre-
quently scoring goals is an indicator of competence in 
football, which is highly regarded by people who play or 
like football. As such, top goal scorers tend to attain pres-
tige within football teams. However, competence might 
often not be enough to be granted prestige. Competence 
needs to be acknowledged by others (e.g. by having many 
social connections), and these others must expect to ben-
efit from that competence somehow. In our example of 
football players, it would be difficult for an excellent foot-
ball player to be conferred prestige if he/she is never seen 
playing or if he/she plays well but he/she plays in a rival 
team or does not share advice about his/her football skills. 
Therefore, prestige-biased hierarchies are not only meri-
tocratic but also beneficial for less knowledgeable/skilful 
individuals because being close to prestigious individuals 
gives them opportunities for social learning to acquire val-
uable knowledge/skills (Henrich & Gil-White 2001) and 
receive private (Pinker 1998, p. 499) and public (Price & 
Van Vugt 2014) goods.
In contrast, dominance-based hierarchies entail the 
ordering of individuals in the capacity to win fights or 
coerce and intimidate others (Redhead et al. 2018b). Dom-
inance is a form of informal social rank that is imposed 
upon others (de Waal-Andrews et al. 2015; Henrich & 
Gil-White 2001), sometimes with the help of coalitional 
alliances. Consequently, the top of dominance-based hier-
archies are usually occupied by individuals who possess 
physical and material characteristics that are useful to 
win fights and intimidate others, such as having greater 
strength, higher fighting skills, greater coalitional support, 
and the possession of more and/or better weapons or other 
resources that could be used to inflict costs. Therefore, 
dominance-based hierarchies are mainly beneficial for the 
dominant individuals and their allies. People who do not 
have a dominant position tend to dislike this type of hierar-
chy (Brand & Mesoudi 2019; Ridgeway & Diekema 1989) 
and, if possible, try to escape the influence of dominant 
individuals and rebel against them (Boehm et al. 1993; 
Cheng 2019; Ridgeway & Diekema 1989).
Social Rank Cues
Because prestigious and dominant individuals are associ-
ated with benefits and costs respectively in subordinates, 
it is important for subordinates to identify who is prestig-
ious and who is dominant within a social group. To this 
end, people use social rank cues or signals that convey 
information about the level of prestige and dominance of 
other individuals. We classify social rank cues into first-
order and second-order cues (Jiménez & Mesoudi 2019a). 
First-order cues are cues related to the behaviour, appear-
ance, personality, material possessions, etc. of an indi-
vidual. These can be assessed directly by the observer. 
Second-order cues are cues related to the behaviour of 
other people towards an individual and imply, therefore, a 
more indirect assessment of the individual by the observer.
People use prestige cues to infer the competence of an 
individual within a value domain and the willingness of an 
individual to provide benefits for the group. Examples of 
first-order prestige cues are being knowledgeable or skilful 
(Henrich & Gil-White 2001), humble (Cheng et al. 2010), 
and showing altruistic behaviour towards the in-group 
(Halevy et al. 2012). Examples of second-order prestige 
cues are being paid sustained attention to by others with 
prolonged eye contact, being copied by others, being popu-
lar and receiving generalised voluntary deference (Henrich 
& Gil-White 2001).
People use dominance cues to infer the fighting skill 
of an individual and their willingness to use force and 
intimidation to attain their goals. Examples of first-order 
dominance cues are being aggressive or intimidating (Hen-
rich & Gil-White 2001), or being arrogant, narcissistic 
and self-centred (Cheng et al. 2010). Examples of second-
order dominance cues are being paid attention to by others 
but without receiving prolonged eye contact, being obeyed 
by others, being disliked/unpopular, and receiving gen-
eralised coerced deference (Henrich & Gil-White 2001).
In this study, we contrast prestige and dominance cues 
with medium social rank cues. People use medium social 
rank cues to infer that an individual is not particularly 
prestigious or dominant but is not at the bottom of either 
hierarchy. Examples of first-order medium social rank cues 
are having average knowledge or skill, being modest, and 
highly regarding the contribution of others. Examples of 
second-order medium social rank cues are not being paid a 
lot of attention by others, not being very influential within 
a group, and receiving deference by only a small group of 
close friends and relatives.
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Hypotheses
According to Henrich and Gil-White (2001), prestige-based 
hierarchies evolved to identify individuals with better-than-
average fitness-enhancing knowledge/skills from whom to 
learn. Based on their theory, they predicted that high prestige 
individuals are more likely to be copied by others than low 
prestige individuals. This prediction has found some support 
(Atkisson et al. 2012; Brand et al. 2019; Chudek et al. 2012), 
although with limitations (see Jiménez & Mesoudi 2019a, 
b). However, a key piece in the puzzle of how people learn 
from prestigious individuals is missing in the literature. That 
is, there is a lack of studies investigating the cultural trans-
mission of prestige cues themselves. This is an important 
question because in order to preferentially copy prestigious 
individuals, it is necessary to first identify them.
If people select individuals with better-than-average 
knowledge/skills from whom to learn through the identifi-
cation of indirect cues that convey high prestige, as Henrich 
and Gil-White state, then it is likely that natural selection 
(or potentially cultural selection; Heyes, 2018) has shaped 
human cognition to be more attentive to, and process and 
recall better, high prestige social rank cues than social rank 
cues conveying lower prestige. If so, descriptions of indi-
viduals displaying high prestige social rank cues would be 
transmitted with greater fidelity during social interactions 
than descriptions of individuals displaying lower prestige 
social rank cues.
The identification of dominant individuals who are more 
likely to impose costs upon others through physical aggres-
sion or other types of intimidation might also have been 
important in human evolution. Natural selection (or cultural 
selection) might therefore have shaped human cognition to 
be more attentive to, and process and recall better, high 
dominance social rank cues than social rank cues conveying 
lower dominance. If this is true, then descriptions of indi-
viduals displaying high dominance social rank cues would 
be transmitted with greater fidelity during social interac-
tions than descriptions of individuals displaying lower domi-
nance. Consequently, we predict that both high prestige and 
high dominance social rank cues are better transmitted than 
medium social rank cues.
Another important question is whether high dominance 
cues are better transmitted than high prestige social rank 
cues, high prestige cues better transmitted than high domi-
nance cues, or both types of high social rank cues are simi-
larly well transmitted. Previous research suggests that people 
tend to be more attentive to, recall better, and choose to 
transmit more, information conveying negative and threat-
related information than neutral or positive information 
(Bebbington et al. 2017; Blaine & Boyer, 2018) and that 
people are loss aversive, i.e. they prefer not to lose a certain 
amount of money than to gain the same amount of money 
with the same probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; but 
see Mukherjee et al., 2017). These pieces of evidence sug-
gest that avoiding costs might have been more important in 
human evolution than attaining benefits. If so, it is likely 
that people are more attentive to, process, and recall better 
high dominant social rank cues, which signal the capacity 
and disposition of an individual to impose costs on others, 
than high prestige social rank cues, which signal the capac-
ity to provide benefits to others. More specifically, being 
injured is likely to have important negative fitness conse-
quences such as impeding physical mobility and difficulties 
attaining resources. Therefore, high dominance cues, which 
convey the capacity and willingness to inflict costs upon 
others should be easily identified and remembered. In con-
trast, lacking access to the knowledge/skill of a prestigious 
individual might be less detrimental given the fact that other 
individuals of the group (e.g. kin) are likely to possess and 
be willing to share knowledge/skills, which, although less 
valuable than the knowledge/skills of the prestigious indi-
vidual, are still likely to be fitness-enhancing. Consequently, 
we predict that high dominance cues are better transmitted 
than high prestige cues.
In this experiment, we created fictional descriptions of 
three footballers playing in three different local football 
teams, who were described as prestigious, dominant or 
medium social rank. We used a transmission chain experi-
mental design (Bartlett 1932; Mesoudi 2007) in which par-
ticipants were organised in parallel, linear chains of four 
participants (‘cultural generations’) in order to test the 
accumulated effect of memory biases beyond a single indi-
vidual’s recall. Thirty independent chains were run in total. 
Participants in the initial generation received and recalled 
the original descriptions, while the remaining participants 
received the information recalled by participants in the pre-
vious generation of their chain. Before collecting data for 
the experiment, we preregistered the following hypotheses 
on the Open Science Framework (OSF) website (https ://osf.
io/68vcs ):
H1: Both high prestige and high dominance cues are 
more accurately transmitted over experimental cultural 
generations than medium social rank cues.
H2: High dominance cues are more accurately trans-




Following the procedure stated in the preregistration (https 
://osf.io/68vcs ), we recruited online participants through 
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Prolific (www.proli fic.ac;Peer et  al. 2016). Using pre-
screening filters, we selected participants who were aged 
18–60 years, were English native speakers, had British 
Nationality, had an approval rating on previous Prolific stud-
ies of 90% or above, and had not participated in any of our 
previous studies through this website.
The data was collected at four different times (one for 
each ‘cultural generation’), between 12 and 19 November 
2019. Each time we recruited 30 participants to complete 
one generation. Thirty chains were necessary to provide five 
replications of each of the six counterbalanced versions of 
the experimental materials (see ‘Design’ section). Partici-
pants were paid at a rate of £6/h for an estimated time of 
completion of 15 min for generations 1 and 2 (£1.5) and 
10 min for generations 3 and 4 (£1).
Following the exclusion criteria stated in the preregistra-
tion, we excluded from the dataset the data of two partici-
pants who read at least one of the footballers’ descriptions at 
a rate greater than 1080 words/min. We derived this cut-off 
point from a previous transmission chain experiment (Jimé-
nez & Mesoudi, 2020), in which participants who read the 
materials faster than this pace were unable to recall any-
thing. These two excluded participants were replaced by new 
participants. We also excluded two other participants who 
inadvertently occupied the same generation in a chain for 
which we had already collected a response. As stated in the 
preregistration, the responses for participants who completed 
the study first were retained.
Overall, we recruited 124 participants (84 females, 40 
males) aged 18–60 (M = 37.25, SD = 10.27), with 120 
of these participants (82 females, 38 males) aged 18–60 
(M = 37.44, SD = 10.25) included in the analysis.
Materials
Fictional descriptions of three different local footballers 
(John, Bill, and James) who play in different local teams 
(also fictional) were created as materials to transmit along 
the chains. These descriptions were created with the inten-
tion of describing a prestigious (John), a dominant (Bill) and 
a medium social rank (James) footballer, respectively. The 
materials were based on the dominance-prestige distinction 
put forward by Henrich and Gil-White (2001) and Cheng 
et al. (2010). Following this account, John, our prestigious 
footballer, was described as a competent footballer who was 
admired by his teammates. In contrast, Bill, our dominant 
footballer, was described as a violent footballer who was 
feared by his teammates. James, our medium social rank 
footballer, was described as having average football skill 
without evoking strong emotions. We decided to use medium 
social rank rather than low social rank because low social 
ranked individuals were likely to elicit strong emotions of 
pity and sympathy. Medium social rank is lacking in both 
these emotions and in prestige and dominance cues.
The exact descriptions of the three footballers are as 
follows:
Prestigious footballer (John)
Everybody in the football team admires John. He is so skilful 
as a football player that last year he scored the most goals 
in the local league. Consequently, this year members of the 
team unanimously voted to make him captain of the team. 
They also tend to copy whatever he does. At team meetings, 
the other members always pay careful attention to what he 
is saying with their eyes fixed on him. Nevertheless, he is 
modest about his football skills and he always takes other 
team members’ wishes into consideration. Outside of the 
football team, he is also very popular. People often invite 
him to parties because they want to spend time with him.
Dominant footballer (Bill)
Everybody in the football team is afraid of Bill. He is so 
violent as a football player that last month he injured two 
teammates during training. This year he self-appointed him-
self captain without the support of any team member. Other 
teammates tend to obey him. At team meetings, the other 
members always pay careful attention to what he is saying, 
though usually without making eye contact with him. He 
thinks he is the best player and he never takes other team 
members’ wishes into consideration. Outside of the football 
team, people also dislike him, but people invite him to par-
ties because they don’t want to make him angry.
Medium social rank footballer (James)
People in the football team don’t have strong emotions 
towards James. He is an average football player in the team, 
scoring only a few goals last year. This year he wanted to be 
the captain of the team, but he only received two votes. He 
isn’t very influential among his teammates. At team meet-
ings, the other members of the team often don’t listen to 
him very carefully and don’t tend to fix their eyes on him 
for long. He is modest about his football skills, and conse-
quently takes other teammates’ perspectives in high regards. 
Outside the team, he is not particularly popular but he does 
get invited to parties held by his closest friends because they 
like to hang out with him.
Design
A within-chain transmission chain design with four genera-
tions per chain was used. Participants in the first generation 
were asked to read and then recall the original descriptions 
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of all three footballers (prestigious, dominant and medium 
social rank) given in the ‘Materials’ section, although with-
out the labels denoting prestige, dominance, or medium 
social rank. The product of their recall was then transmitted 
to the next participant in their chain (second generation), 
who also recalled the material. This procedure was repeated 
until reaching the fourth generation and across 30 separate, 
parallel transmission chains to provide independent replica-
tions of transmission effects. The order of presentation of the 
three descriptions was fully counterbalanced, which resulted 
in six different versions of the experimental materials (5 
replications for each version).
Procedure
Participants were first randomly assigned to one of the 30 
transmission chains and provided with the following instruc-
tions: ‘In the following you will read three descriptions of 
three football players who play in different local football 
teams in the UK. We would like you to read these descrip-
tions very carefully as you will be asked some questions 
about each of the football players later. It is very important 
that you read the information at a pace that allows you full 
comprehension as you will be asked some questions about 
this information later’. Second, they read the three descrip-
tions of the prestigious, dominant, and medium social rank 
footballer. Third, they were asked to provide their basic 
demographic information (i.e. gender, age, first language, 
nationality, profession and nearest city from where they 
live). This served as a distractor task. Fourth, they were 
asked to recall the descriptions of the three footballers one 
by one. They were given between a minimum of 1 minute 
and a maximum of 3 minutes to recall the description of 
each footballer. Lastly, participants were thanked for their 
participation and informed about the goal of the experiment 
and our hypotheses.
Coding and Data Analyses
Participants’ recall accuracy was assessed by comparing 
their correct recall with a preregistered table (https ://osf.io/
b4nqu /)1 containing twelve social rank cues for each descrip-
tion (Table 1). Examples of prestige cues are to be skilful, 
admired, and copied. Examples of dominance cues are to 
be violent, feared and obeyed. Examples of medium social 
rank cues are to have average skill, not to evoke strong emo-
tions, and not to be very influential. Table 1 contains minor 
differences to the preregistered version. After data collec-
tion, we realised that two cues contained two cues each. For 
instance, ‘being chosen as captain’, which in the original 
table was considered a unique prestige cue could be divided 
into having the position of captain (being captain) and the 
process of attainment of the captainship (being chosen/
voted). The same applied to the equivalent dominance cue 
(‘being self-appointed captain’ = being captain + attaining 
Table 1  Recall coding template. Propositions 4 and 11 were split into propositions 4A and 4B, and 11A and 11B, respectively, after data collec-
tion. See main text for details
Propositions Prestigious (John) Dominant (Bill) Medium social rank (James)
P1 Is admired Is feared Doesn’t arouse strong emotions
P2 Skilful Violent Average skill
P3 Highest goal scorer Injured teammates Few goals




A: Not being captain
B: Not having many votes
P5 Is copied Is obeyed Isn’t very influential
P6 Is paid attention to/is listened to Is paid attention to/is listened to Is not paid (a lot of) attention to/is not 
listened to (very carefully)
P7 Received eye contact People avoid eye contact Rarely prolonged eye contact
P8 Is modest He thinks he is the best (arrogant/narcis-
sist)
Is modest
P9 Takes others into consideration Doesn’t take others into consideration Take others’ perspectives in high regard 
(takes others into consideration)
P10 Is popular/liked Is unpopular/disliked Isn’t particularly popular
P11A + P11B A: is invited to parties
B: by the team/people
A: is invited to parties
B: by the team/people
A: is invited to parties
B: by closest friends
P12 People want to spend more time with him People don’t want to make him angry Closest friends like to hang out with him
1 1The registration form was submitted on 11th November 2019. The 
data was collected between 12 and 19 November. During data collec-
tion, we realised that the supplementary materials for the preregistra-
tion (i.e. experimental materials, table for coding recall and R script) 
were not attached to the preregistration form and uploaded again on 
15 November 2019.
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the captainship through self-appointment) and medium 
social rank cue (‘not enough votes for being captain’ = not 
being captain + receiving few votes). The other proposi-
tion (‘being invited to parties’ for both the prestigious and 
dominant individuals, and ‘being invited to parties of clos-
est friends’ for the medium social rank individual), were 
considered unfair for the medium social rank individual as 
it contained more information to remember. Consequently, 
we changed the recall coding system to accept ‘being invited 
to parties’ as one cue for the three individuals. An addi-
tional proposition specified the people who invited them (i.e. 
only their friends for the medium social rank individual and 
the team or people in general for both the prestigious and 
dominant individual). Both coding systems (the preregis-
tered and the new) yielded qualitatively similar results and, 
consequently, we only report here the results derived from 
the new, improved coding system. A second coder, who was 
blind to the hypothesis, coded 10% of the chains (3 chains) 
using this improved coding system. A high inter-coding reli-
ability between both coders (Cohen’s kappa = 0.86) was 
found.
All statistical analyses were conducted with Bayesian 
package brms (Bürkner 2017) in R 3.5.3 (R Core and Team 
2019). As in our previous transmission chain experiments 
(Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2020 ; Jiménez et al. 2018), all the 
regression models were multilevel with intercepts varying by 
chain. We treated generation as a monotonic variable (Bürk-
ner & Charpentier 2018) as recall decreases over genera-
tions but the amount of the decrease varies between adjacent 
generations (Jiménez & Mesoudi, in press). We adopted a 
model comparison approach, comparing a control model that 
included generation as the sole predictor of recall to a model 
that, in addition to generation, included the type of social 
rank cue (prestige, dominance, medium social rank) as a 
predictor. We use leave-one-out cross-validation information 
criterion (LOOIC; Vehtari et al. 2019) as a measure of rela-
tive model fit. LOOIC can be interpreted similarly to Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) or Watanabe-Akaike informa-
tion criterion (WAIC), such that a lower LOOIC indicates 
better fit to the data.
Results
Cumulative Recall
Figure 1 shows the number of correctly recalled social rank 
cues across cultural generations for the description of each 
footballer (prestigious, dominant, and medium rank). As 
in similar transmission chain experiments, the number of 
correctly recalled social rank cues decreases over cultural 
generations. As predicted by H1, the figure clearly shows 
that the prestige and dominance cues were better transmit-
ted than the medium social rank cues. This effect is present 
from the first generation, and in each subsequent generation. 
Contrary to H2, the figure does not show any clear differ-
ences in the transmission of prestige and dominance cues 
over generations.
Fig. 1  Raw means for the recall 
of information with 1.60 stand-
ard error bars (corresponding 
to 89% CI as given in the text) 
plotted against generation. As 
predicted by H1, both prestige 
cues and dominance cues were 
better transmitted than medium 
social rank cues. Contrary to 
H2, there were no clear differ-
ences in the transmission of 
prestige cues and dominance 
cues over generations
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To statistically analyse these trends, we produced sev-
eral Bayesian multilevel Poisson regression models (see 
Table 2). We first ran a generation-only model that included 
generation as the sole predictor of recall, which was used as 
our control model (LOOIC = 1431.3, SE = 17.4). We com-
pared this model with our two preregistered a priori models. 
The first was a social rank model, which included the three 
types of social rank cues (prestige, dominance, and medium 
social rank cues) together with generation as predictors of 
recall (LOOIC = 1400.4, SE = 17.5). The second was an 
interaction model, which included the main effects of the 
social rank cues and generation together with their interac-
tion (LOOIC = 1400.9, SE = 17.5). Both a priori models 
had a better fit than the control generation model, with the 
social rank model being slightly better than the interaction 
model. As predicted by H1, both dominance cues (M = 5.15, 
SD = 2.75, B = 0.30, SE = 0.06, 89% CI [0.20, 0.40]) and 
prestige cues (M = 5.12, SD = 2.76, B = 0.31, SE = 0.06, 
89% CI [0.21, 0.41]) were better recalled than medium social 
rank cues (M = 3.79, SD = 2.58). Contrary to H2, the domi-
nance cues were not better recalled than the prestige cues 
(B = − 0.01, SE = 0.06, 89% CI [− 0.10, 0.09]).
Exploratory analyses were conducted to study the pos-
sible effects of gender, age, and interest in football on the 
transmission of social rank cues. The addition of these three 
variables together or separately to the social rank model did 
not improve its model fit (see Supplementary Materials).
Narrative Evolution
To study the narrative evolution, we analysed which social 
rank cues were well conserved in generation 4 for the 
description of the prestigious, dominant and medium social 
rank individuals. We also identified participants’ inferences 
at any generation within the chains and assessed their con-
gruency with the dominance-prestige-medium social rank 
distinction. These analyses were not included in the prereg-
istration and are exploratory.
For the prestigious individual, the cue that was best con-
served in generation 4 was being popular (67%), which was 
followed by being invited to parties (47%), being the team 
captain (40%), being skilful playing football (30%), and 
being voted for the captain position (33%). Participants’ 
inferences mainly referred to his good social skills (e.g. 
‘nice’, ‘friendly’, ‘kind’, ‘open’), confidence, competence 
(e.g. ‘all round’, ‘golden boy’), and the wish of people to 
be like him. These inferences are all congruent with the 
notion of a prestigious individual as it was described in the 
introduction, i.e. as a competent, generous, and respected 
individual.
For the dominant individual, the cue that was best con-
served was being feared (60%), which was followed by being 
team captain (43%), being invited to parties (37%), being 
aggressive (33%), having self-appointed himself the captain 
position (30%), being obeyed (30%), and being unpopular 
(30%). Participants’ inferences refer to him as an ‘angry’, 
‘mean’, ‘nasty’, ‘unpleasant’, ‘direct’, ‘forceful’, ‘hostile’, 
‘loud’ ‘bully’ who ‘shouts a lot’, ‘is not a good listener’, 
and ‘people don’t enjoy his company’. These inferences 
are congruent with the notion of a dominant individual as 
described in the introduction, i.e. an aggressive individual 
who is feared by people.
For the medium social rank individual, the cue that was 
best conserved was having average football skill (57%), fol-
lowed by being invited to parties (43%). Participants’ infer-
ences refer to him as a ‘good person’ (also ‘nice’, ‘pleasant’, 
Table 2  Unstandardised coefficients (B) and their standard errors (in 
brackets) for each of the main regression models. Square brackets 
indicate the reference categories for the categorical predictors. Ordi-
nal predictors were modelled as monotonic effects and are labelled 
mo(variable). More regression models and further details can be 
found in the Supplementary Materials. LOOIC  =  leave-one-out 
cross-validation information criterion (lower values indicate better 
fit to the data; see text for details). Model weights were calculated 
using pseudo-Bayesian model average weights with Bayesian boot-
strap (Vehtari & Gabry 2019; Yao et al. 2018) with the loo package 
(Vehtari et al. 2019)
Unstandardised coefficients Main regression models
Generation Cues Cues × generation
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Intercept 1.92 (0.08) 1.70 (0.09) 1.76 (0.10)
mo(Generation) − 0.97 (0.07) − 0.97 (0.07) − 1.12 (0.13)
Cue [Dominance] 0.30 (0.06) 0.21 (0.09)
Cue [Prestige] 0.31 (0.06) 0.25 (0.08)
Cue[Dominance]:Generation 0.24 (0.17)
Cue[Prestige]:Generation 0.16 (0.17)
LOOIC 1431.3 1400.4 1400.9
Model weights 0.000 0.562 0.438
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who ‘could be trusted in times of need’) with an introverted 
personality (e.g. ‘quiet’, ‘shy’, ‘reserved’ person who ‘may 
lack confidence in larger groups’). These characteristics are 
compatible with the notion of medium social rank. How-
ever, opposite characteristics, i.e. being a bad person with 
an extroverted personality, would also be compatible with 
the notion of medium social rank.
Discussion
In this study, we tested whether high social rank cues (both 
prestige and dominance cues) are better transmitted than 
medium social rank cues (H1) and whether dominance cues 
are better transmitted than prestige cues (H2). To test these 
two hypotheses, we conducted a transmission chain experi-
ment with 30 independent transmission chains each compris-
ing four cultural generations. Supporting H1, we found that 
both prestige and dominance cues were better transmitted 
than medium social rank cues. The recall advantage of both 
high social rank cues was evident in the first generation, 
which suggests that this effect might be strong enough to be 
detected in single-generation experiments. This transmission 
advantage of the high social rank cues was maintained, but 
did not increase, in the subsequent generations, indicating 
its long-term stability over repeated transmission episodes. 
This result is consistent with the evolutionary importance of 
both prestige-based and dominance-based social hierarchies 
in human social groups (Henrich & Gil-White 2001).
Contrary to H2, dominance cues were no better trans-
mitted than prestige cues. We predicted a transmission 
advantage of dominance cues over prestige cues because we 
assumed that avoiding the potential costs produced by domi-
nant individuals (e.g. physical injuries) was more important 
than the potential benefits provided by prestigious individu-
als (e.g. high-quality information to socially learn). Our 
experiment does not directly test this assumption, but the 
lack of statistical differences between the cumulative recall 
of prestige and dominance cues suggests that identifying 
both prestigious and dominant individuals might have been 
equally important in our evolutionary history.
Recall-based transmission chain experiments are gener-
ally used to study content transmission biases, i.e. a trans-
mission advantage of information with particular intrinsic 
characteristics. These studies have identified different con-
tent biases such as transmission advantages for social (Mes-
oudi et al. 2006; Stubbersfield et al. 2014), emotional (Eriks-
son & Coultas 2014; Stubbersfield et al. 2017), negative 
(Bebbington et al. 2017), and stereotypical (Kashima 2000; 
Lyons & Kashima 2006) information. Our results suggest 
another content transmission bias to add to this list: a social 
rank content transmission bias. However, the results might 
also be explained, not by a specific content bias referring 
to social rank, but by a previously identified content bias 
relating to emotion. Stubbersfield et al. (2017) showed that 
narratives with high emotional content are better transmit-
ted than narratives with low emotional content. This effect 
occurred independent of the valence of the emotion (positive 
as in amusement vs negative as in disgust). It is plausible 
that our descriptions of both the prestigious individual and 
the dominant individual have elicited a higher level of emo-
tionality than our description of our medium social rank 
individual. The description of a prestigious football player 
might have elicited positive emotions like admiration, while 
the description of the dominant football player might have 
elicited negative emotions like fear. This possibility would 
be congruent with Henrich and Gil-White’s dual evolution-
ary model of social hierarchy, which states that the emotions 
of admiration and fear elicited in others are the mechanisms 
by which prestigious and dominant individuals respectively 
acquired high social rank and influence. As emotions are a 
proximate mechanism, emotional and social rank content 
biases are not necessarily alternative explanations. Emotions 
such as admiration and fear could be the proximate mecha-
nism by which the ultimate-level social rank bias operates. 
Future studies should use procedures to balance the emo-
tional content across experimental conditions to test whether 
the elicitation of emotions is the mechanism by which social 
rank bias operates at a proximate level.
Another possibility is that the experimental materials for 
both prestige and dominance cues were easier to remember 
(i.e. less cognitively demanding) than the medium social 
rank cues due to their higher level of concreteness (Heath & 
Heath 2008). High social rank cues tend to refer to a small 
subset of individuals within a group and are clearly distin-
guishable from lower social rank cues due to their exception-
ality (e.g. highest goal scorer for prestige, violent for domi-
nance). In contrast, medium social rank cues refer to a larger 
number of individuals and are difficult to distinguish from 
low social rank cues. Therefore, the transmission advantage 
of high social rank cues over medium social rank cues might 
be a consequence of their capacity to differentiate between 
people rather than identifying high social rank individuals. 
Future studies might use a description of an individual at the 
bottom of both dominance and prestige hierarchies to avoid 
the problem of different levels of concreteness between high 
social rank and lower social rank. A description of an indi-
vidual at the bottom of a social hierarchy could also elicit 
higher level of emotions (e.g. compassion, pity) than the 
medium social rank description, which might help to alle-
viate the problem of different levels of emotional content.
Although we tried to make the descriptions of the foot-
ballers differ only in cues of prestige and dominance, in 
hindsight there were a few other differences in the way we 
described them. For example, while the prestigious and 
medium ranked footballers contained information about the 
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number of goals they scored (i.e. cues of success), this infor-
mation was absent from the dominant description. While this 
asymmetry between the prestigious and dominant individual 
could not have explained our results, given that we found no 
difference in the transmission fidelity of these two descrip-
tions, future work should more carefully control or eliminate 
such asymmetries.
It is interesting to compare our results with those from 
a similar transmission chain experiment that we recently 
conducted in which the information to recall by participants 
were arguments in favour and against the replacement of 
textbooks by computer tablets at schools (Jiménez & Mes-
oudi, 2020). These arguments were associated with sources 
of information with different level of prestige and relevance 
for the topic (Head of the Department of Education of a 
leading university: high prestige, high relevance; an airline 
pilot: high prestige, low relevance; a cleaner: low prestige, 
low relevance), which were artificially maintained through-
out generations. That is, prestige was manipulated as a 
model-based transmission bias. Contrary to the prestige bias 
hypothesis, there were no differences in the transmission of 
information between the arguments associated with high and 
low prestige sources. In the present experiment, prestige was 
manipulated as a content bias and we found an advantage of 
high prestige social rank cues over medium social rank cues. 
This suggests that, even though prestige cues are memorable 
compared to lower-prestige cues as we have shown here, the 
content of the information itself might be a more important 
factor on the cumulative recall of information than the pres-
tige of the source of information (see also Berl et al. 2020).
In conclusion, we have found evidence for the higher 
fidelity transmission of high social rank cues, referring to 
both prestige and dominance, than medium social rank cues. 
We found no evidence for a transmission advantage of domi-
nant over prestige cues, with each type transmitted equally 
well. However, the mechanism that explains these results is 
not clear. It could be the consequence of a specific content 
transmission bias referring to high social rank (social rank 
content transmission bias) or it could be a more general fea-
ture of the information such as a higher level of emotional 
content or specificity of the experimental materials for both 
the prestigious and dominant individual than for the medium 
social rank individual. Given that this is the first experiment 
studying the cultural transmission of social rank cues, we 
encourage both direct and conceptual replications of this 
study to further explore the transmission advantage of social 
rank cues.
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